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Abstract
Background: Targeting efforts aimed at increasing access to care for the poorest by reducing to a minimum or
completely eliminating payments at point of use are increasingly being adopted across low and middle income
countries, within the framework of Universal Health Coverage policies. No evidence, however, is available on the
real cost of designing and implementing these efforts. Our study aimed to fill this gap in knowledge through the
systematic assessment of both the financial and economic costs associated with designing and implementing a
pro-poor community-based targeting intervention across eight districts in rural Burkina Faso.
Methods: We conducted a partial retrospective economic evaluation (i.e. estimating costs, but not benefits) associated
with the abovementioned targeting intervention. We adopted a health system perspective, including all costs incurred
by the government and its development partners as well as costs incurred by the community when working
as volunteers on behalf of government structures. To trace both financial and economic costs, we combined
Activity-Based Costing with Resource Consumption Accounting. To this purpose, we consulted and extracted
information from all relevant design/implementation documents and conducted additional key informant structured
interviews to assess the resource consumption that was not valued in the documents.
Results: For the entire community-based targeting intervention, we estimated a financial cost of USD 587,510 and an
economic cost of USD 1,213,447. The difference was driven primarily by the value of the time contributed by
the community. Communities carried the main economic burden. With a total of 102,609 ultra-poor identified,
the financial cost and the economic cost per ultra-poor person were respectively USD 5,73 and USD 11,83.
Conclusion: The study is first of its kind to accurately trace the financial and economic costs of a community-based
targeting intervention aiming to identify the ultra-poor. The financial costs amounted to USD 5,73 and the economic
costs to USD 11,83 per ultra-poor person identified. The financial costs of almost USD 6 represents 21% of the per
capita government expenditure on health.
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Key messages
 This study fills an important knowledge gap on cost
of community-based selection and targeting
interventions
 Financial costs associated with community-based
targeting in Burkina Faso amounted to USD 5,73
and the economic costs to USD 11,83 per ultra-poor
person identified
 Economic costs amounted to USD 1,213,447 including
the value of the effort contributed by volunteers,
exceeding by two-folds the financial costs of USD
587,510
Background
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) aspires to provide af-
fordable and quality health care to all [1]. However,
many low and middle income countries (LMICs) con-
tinue to rely on user fees which severely limits access to
care and use of health services, especially for the poorest
segments in a society [2]. In order to protect the most
vulnerable people from financial hardship, some coun-
tries have opted for exempting the poorest from user
fees [3] or for subsidizing health insurance premiums
[4]. The identification and selection of the poor for
user-fee exemption or insurance premium subsidization
has been proven to be very challenging [5].
In the absence of universal criteria to define poverty
and identify the poorest, countries have traditionally
adopted various targeting methods. In the literature, the
identification of beneficiaries is presented as the process
of selecting the persons that benefit from a certain inter-
vention. Targeting, on the other hand, is commonly used
as a broader term which includes the identification as
well as the actual act of allocating scarce resources to
the poorest with the aim of achieving certain policy ob-
jectives to preserve or improve health equity [6].
In the health sector, most targeting experiences derive
from those with the greatest health risks or the highest
ability to benefit from the programs [7]. Those are gen-
erally the poorest [8] but can also be other groups of
people such as the elderly, orphans or people with dis-
abilities [9].
Generally, high-income countries use a form of
means-testing and identify ultra-poor based on a certain
income threshold. On the contrary, targeting strategies
without a direct observation of income, such as proxy
means testing (PMT) and community targeting, are pre-
dominantly used in LMICs [6]. While PMT uses a formal
algorithm to identify households’ wealth, community
based targeting (CBT) collects information from local
leaders [10].
All targeting mechanism are prone to errors and gen-
erate costs [11]. Various studies have shown that there is
no best solution to identify beneficiaries for targeting
health benefits. Relative accuracy and cost effectiveness
are said to be best achieved by a well-designed and
implemented mechanism [9]. However, the scientific
community continues to debate the relative costs and
benefits of universal vs. targeted strategies in allocating
resources to the poorest and alleviating poverty [12–14].
The question is whether the costs associated with the
CBT program actually compensate for the savings ac-
crued when offering subsidized or free health services
only to a selected number of individuals.
These arguments are mostly postulated in the light of
theoretical assumptions on the costs and benefits associ-
ated with targeting procedures, but are not substantiated
by any extensive empirical evidence [15]. The literature
suggests that CBT can potentially contribute to a reduc-
tion in administrative costs compared to other targeting
methods [8, 16, 17], since the bulk of resources, such as
time and expertise, are provided by community mem-
bers who are usually not remunerated. Prior studies [18,
19] addressed the costs of pro-poor targeting programs
briefly by focusing on the financial expenses and showed
that engaging the poor to identify the poorest is not
costly. However, both studies disregarded, amongst other
components, the time volunteers (e.g. community mem-
bers) invested into the targeting exercise. Prior studies
which addressed the effectiveness of pro-poor targeting
showed inconsistent results [20–23]. These evaluations
have focused primarily on estimating how effective pro-
grams are in relation to how well all members of a cer-
tain target group are included, and members of the
non-target group excluded from participating in a tar-
geted program [20–22]. The available evidence, however,
is almost completely silent as to whether targeting pol-
icies for the poor offer good value for money, as mea-
sured in terms the relationship between their costs and
their benefits.
Towards this ends, our economic evaluation began to
fill an important gap in knowledge by assessing both the
financial and the economic costs associated with design-
ing and implementing a pro-poor targeting project, with
specific focus on the identification and targeting compo-
nent integrated within the Performance Based Financing
(PBF) intervention recently rolled out in Burkina Faso
[24]. We plan to include these first cost estimates into
more comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis of pro-
poor targeting policies in the future.
Methods
Study setting
This study took place in Burkina Faso, where a PBF
intervention was launched in 2014 under coordination
of the Ministry of Health (MoH) with financial sup-
port from the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund
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(HRITF), administered by the World Bank (WB). The
Programme d’Appui Au Développement (PADS), Burkina
Faso’s initiative to better coordinate and manage resources
for the implementation of the National Health Develop-
ment Plan, channeled the funding provided by the HRITF
to the CBT intervention. The Society for Studies and Pub-
lic Health Research (SERSAP), a for-profit consultancy
firm, led the implementation of the CBT intervention. The
objective of the intervention is to combine a supply-side
(PBF) with a demand side (subsidy for the poorest) compo-
nent to maximize health gains for the poorest. [25] In eight
out of a total of 12 districts implementing PBF, healthcare
providers receive payments based on a fixed unit price per
service, plus a lump-sum to reimburse (at the expected
average cost of treatment) for loss of income due to loss of
user fees, by treating the ultra-poor for free. Thereby, it is
ensured that health facilities are not disadvantaged by de-
livering care to the ultra-poor who do not pay the health
providers directly [26].
The process of selecting and identifying the ultra-poor
by community members, including the design and imple-
mentation of the structures, lasted from May 2014–January
2016. Across the eight districts, it covered 1,745,789 indi-
viduals, i.e. approximately 10% of the country’s total popu-
lation (18.1 million) [27]. Additional file 1 provides details
on the organization of the CBT selection process, under
leadership by SERSAP. A total of 1172 Community Selec-
tion Committees (CSI) (gender-balanced) were set up
across the eight districts at the village level to select the
ultra-poor based on their profound knowledge of the
population, and establish lists of the ultra-poor. The CBT
selection processes were guided by the definition of an
ultra -poor (indigent) person as “someone who is ex-
tremely socially and economically disadvantaged, unable to
care for himself (herself) and who is without internal or ex-
ternal resources” [20] and was meant to result in the com-
pilation of community-specific lists of the ultra-poor as
individuals eligible to benefit from a user fee exemption.
The lists of the ultra-poor persons were verified by
two entities, the Local Implementation Teams (ELMEO)
and the Local Validation Groups (GVL). For this valid-
ation process, the respective teams used a list of 20
ultra-poor criteria which were initially developed in the
context of the action research done in one district in
Burkina (Ouargaye) [28]. The ELMEO randomly selected
people from the list and verified whether these criteria
were respected (external validation), before handing the
list over to the GVL. The GVL then went through the
entire list and checked whether each selected person ful-
filled the ultra-poor criteria, then confirmed or rejected
their ultra-poor status (internal validation). The WB de-
veloped a database of the ultra-poor in order to compile
detailed information about them (e.g. village, full name,
age, gender). Thirty-five enumerators collected these
data, including digital pictures of the ultra-poor. The in-
formation was used to issue identity cards (produced in
Vietnam) that had to be shown in order to receive basic
primary, secondary and tertiary health care free of
charge (fees and drugs) at all public health facilities
within the implementation districts of the PBF [29].
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) was secured by the
ELMEO, the Regional Directorate for Health and Social
Action and the Regional Technical Assistants (ATR).
Originally, it was envisioned that 15 to 20% of the popu-
lation will be targeted and exempted from user fee pay-
ment. On average 6% of the total population were finally
identified as the ultra-poor [29].
Study design and conceptual approach
We conducted a retrospective partial economic evalu-
ation [30] with the objective of estimating both the fi-
nancial and the economic costs of the abovementioned
community-based identification and targeting of the
ultra-poor. We refer to our work as a partial economic
evaluation, since we focused exclusively on documenting
costs and not on establishing a relationship between the
costs and consequences of the intervention. This deci-
sion is linked to two factors. First, we wanted to focus
exclusively and carefully on the cost component to fill
the important gap in knowledge on the real cost of tar-
geting outlined earlier. Second, at the time of our study,
the intervention was ongoing; hence, it was not yet pos-
sible to determine the extent to which targeting had ac-
tually contributed to an increase in health service
utilization among the poorest and the related health ser-
vice provision costs. Hence, we traced costs for the
design phase (May 2014–August 2014) and the imple-
mentation phase (September 2014–January 2016), defin-
ing as implementation only the process of identifying
and selecting the ultra-poor, not of providing healthcare
services to them.
As financial costs (accounting costs), we defined all ex-
plicit financing transactions made by any of the con-
cerned actors to carry out any activity related to either
the design or the implementation of the intervention.
These costs can be verified retrospectively on the ac-
counting systems of the implementing agencies. As eco-
nomic costs, we defined the real value of the resources
consumed by the intervention.
We adopted a health system perspective, meaning that
we aimed at tracing all costs incurred by the MoH and
its partners, including development partners and imple-
menting agencies. Costs incurred at the community level
were included in the analysis insofar as the community
was engaged as a volunteer agent to act on behalf of the
Ministry as a formal implementing partner, effectively
carrying out/substituting key intervention functions.
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To trace both financial and economic costs, we com-
bined Activity-Based Costing (ABC-approach) with Re-
source Consumption Accounting. ABC aggregates costs
by activity, attributing indirect and support expenses to
the individual activities [31]. Resource Consumption Ac-
counting first itemizes (identification) and measures
(measurement) the resources necessary to carry out a
given activity and then values (valuation) the consump-
tion of each resource for service provision and calculat-
ing or estimating the costs of each resource [32].
Data collection
We carried out data collection over a period of six
months from October 2016 to March 2017. We com-
puted all costs in US dollars (USD), adjusting for infla-
tion from the year in which the costs were incurred to
the year 2015. We used the average exchange rate for
the period May 2014 to January 2016 to convert values
from FCFA (Central French African Francs) to USD (1
FCFA = USD 0.00164 in 2014; USD 0.00168 in 2015;
USD 0.00167 in 2016).
In line with the conceptual approach described earlier,
data collection reflected three steps: identification, meas-
urement and valuation.
Step 1: Identification
We started the data collection by asking the main
stakeholders (MoH and WB) and implementing actors
from the central level to share planning and implemen-
tation documents with us, including financial statements
(e.g. initial budgets, project reports), that would allow us
to reconstruct all activities carried out from the moment
the intervention was conceived to the moment the iden-
tification cards were distributed to the ultra-poor. We
examined all project documents in order to generate a
detailed list of activities, including those of the main
stakeholder as well as of the different implementation
actors involved at each and every stage of the design and
implementation phase (Table 1). This process allowed us
to identify additional actors beyond those working dir-
ectly for one of the agencies who had actively led design
and/or implementation activities (such as development
partners, academics, and consultants).
Step 2: Measurement
To estimate resource use, we triangulated information
across data sources and filled gaps that emerged as we
progressed through the data by conducting a series of
face-to-face key informant interviews. We interviewed
the two central level coordinators employed at SERSAP
and the four regional coordinators. We used structured
interview forms to ask respondents to recall the time
spent by the various actors, including communities, on
design and implementation activities (Additional files 2,
3 and 4). In addition, we asked key WB staff, academics,
and consultants to estimate their time commitment to
the program (interviews done by phone and/or email)
(Additional file 5). WB staff was also instrumental in
identifying material resource consumption, for instance
in relation to the production of the cards.
Step 3: Valuation
We first quantified the units of each resource and
multiplied them by its unit costs. Reconstructing the in-
tervention’s financial costs, for both personnel and ma-
terial resources, was a relatively straightforward process,
as financial transactions related to the intervention could
easily be reconstructed by combining financial state-
ments by SERSAP, PADS and the WB. Reconstructing
the intervention’s economic costs was a more complex
process. Material resources that could not be traced in
Table 1 List of activities (aggregated)
List of Core Activities (aggregated) Description
1. General Coordination/Management
Design Phase
• All general activities performed during the design of the process (e.g. initial workshops to define the targeting
strategy, seminars to develop the concept note, internal workshops hold by SERSAP
2. General Coordination/Management
Implementation Phase
• All general coordination, management and supervision activities performed during the implementation
phase (e.g. informational meetings at central, regional and district level and the national launch of the
targeting intervention)
3. Training • Training of ELMEO, CSS, GVL, CSI and the enumerators
4. Selection of the ultra-poor • All activities related to the actual selection of in the villages (e.g. CSI meetings to select the ultra-poor and
to establish lists, validation sessions by GVL to validate lists etc.)
5. Data Collection • Development of the data collection program and questionnaires, preparation of tablets, data collection by
35 enumerators in the villages, photo taking and management of the ultra-poor database
• Community members supported the enumerators to locate selected and assisted during data collection
6. Card Production/Distribution • Every ultra-poor person received a personalized identity card to receive free services at health facilities
• A Vietnamese IT company produced the ID cards and shipped them to Burkina Faso
7. M&E • All monitoring and quality control activities
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the financial records, such as donated vehicles or do-
nated supplies, were valued using current market prices,
for instance average vehicle rental and average room
rental prices. We used the human capital approach (ac-
cording to which value of time is measured through the
earnings of an individual [30] to value the time of
personnel who contributed to design and/or implemen-
tation without being directly compensated for it. Specif-
ically, we valued: 1. the time of MoH staff using average
earnings for the different civil servant cadres [33]; 2. the
time of community members using minimum daily wage
(USD 2.31) [34]; 3. the time of all international develop-
ment partners and consultants using standard WB con-
sultancy rates (300 USD a day for a mid-career
consultant and 600 USD a day for a senior consultant).
Data analysis
First, keeping the differentiation between financial and
economic costs and differentiating between the design
and the implementation phase, we aggregated cost infor-
mation by activity and by cost category. To simplify
reading and facilitate understanding, we aggregated sin-
gle activities into broad analysis categories by combining
conceptual analogous activities. In addition, we aggre-
gated costs by single actor by carefully assessing where
expenses were really incurred. Then, we computed both
financial and economic cost per ultra-poor person se-
lected. As a final step, to test how the value of the inter-
vention may change depending on variations in the cost
of individual items, we conducted one-way sensitivity
analyses, varying the percentage of overhead costs, the
wage for informal workers and the budget provided by
SERSAP including the costs for personnel, equipment,
selection process and data collection. Additional file 6
provides an additional analysis of the financial and eco-
nomic costs, first broken down by fixed and variables
costs. The single activities with their costs are then
assigned to the respective organizational level of the
targeting program (national, regional, district, CSPS, vil-
lage and indigent). The annex further provides cost
functions which can be applied to estimate the total fi-
nancial and economic costs for potential expansions of
the program.
Ethical considerations
Ethical clearance was granted by both the Ethics Commit-
tee of Heidelberg University (protocol S-272/2013) and by
the Comité National d’Éthique pour la Recherche en Santé
(CNERS) in Burkina Faso (protocol number 2013–7-066
and 2017–9-138). All parties linked to the intervention
agreed on processing the data for this study. Information
from informants was obtained anonymously.
Results
Table 2 presents the financial and economic costs of the
CBT intervention across activity clusters by phase. The
estimated financial costs accounted for USD 587,510
and represent about 48% of the total economic value.
The total economic cost of the CBT intervention was
USD 1,213,447 The selection process represents the
most relevant economic cost component. With an esti-
mated economic value of USD 392,060 the selection of
the ultra-poor carried out by community members rep-
resents one third of the total value of the intervention,
followed by the data collection step with an estimated
value of USD 328,958.
With a total of 102.609 identified ultra-poor persons,
the financial costs amounted to USD 5,73 and the total
economic costs to USD 11,83 per identified ultra-poor
person.
Distribution of financial and economic costs by actor
Sixty percent of the total financial costs (=USD 350,704)
were incurred by activities carried out by the implemen-
tation agency. Forty percent of the financial costs (=USD
Table 2 Financial and economic costs by activity cluster (in USD)
Activity Financial Costs Percentage (%) Economic Costs Percentage (%)
Design Phase
General Coordination & Management 6599 1% 62,174 5%
Implementation Phase
General Coordination & Management 23,350 4% 63,177 5%
Training 86,298 15% 159,824 13%
Selection of the ultra-poor 85,162 14% 392,060 32%
Data Collection 187,948 32% 328,958 27%
Card Production & Distribution 107,000 18% 116,101 10%
M&E 11,339 2% 11,339 1%
Overhead (13% SERSAP, 20% WB) 79,814 14% 79,814 7%
Total 587,510 100% 1,213,447 100%
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236,807) came about due to activities performed by the
WB.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of economic costs by
actor. The highest proportion of economic costs were
incurred at the community level (43%), followed by the
implementation agency (30%) and the WB (25%). Only
≤1% of the economic costs was due to activities per-
formed by external consultants, Non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) and ministries.
Financial and economic costs – Design phase by cost
categories across activity clusters
Table 3 shows the financial and economic costs by cost
categories for the activity “General Coordination &
Management” performed at the design phase of the CBT
intervention. The total amounted to USD 7457 financial
costs and USD 63,032 economic costs, including the
overhead costs. More than 80% of the financial costs
and more than 70% of the economic costs were due to
human resource expenses.
Financial and economic cost implementation phase by
cost categories across activity clusters
Table 4 shows the financial and total economic costs by
cost categories across all activities performed during the
implementation phase of the CBT intervention. The
total amounted to USD 580,053 financial costs and USD
1,150,415 economic costs including the overhead costs.
Just like in the design phase of the intervention, human
resources accounted for the largest portion of imple-
mentation costs - almost 50% of the financial costs and
72% of the total economic costs (Figs. 2 and 3) . With
USD 378,284, the biggest proportion of human re-
sources was spent on the selection of ultra-poor,
followed by the data collection with USD 274,601.
Distribution of financial and economic costs -
implementation phase
Figures 2 and 3.
Sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity analysis revealed that varying the wage
for informal workers from minimum to average wage
did not have a major impact on the total economic costs.
By applying this variation, the total economic costs only
changed by USD 50,506 (= 4.2%) and amounted to USD
1,263,953 (Additional file 7). Varying the percentage of
overhead costs also only had little impact on the total
costs of the CBT intervention. More specifically, increas-
ing the percentage of overhead costs (16% for SERSAP
and 22% for WB) led to an increase by USD 13,258 and
amounted to a new economic value of USD 1,226,705.
On the other hand, reducing the percentage of overhead
costs (10% for SERSAP and 18% for WB) resulted in a
new economic value of USD 1,200,190 (Additional file 8).
Varying the budget provided by SERSAP also impacted
the overall economic value only marginally. Increasing
the SERSAP budget (costs for personnel, equipment and
the selection process) by 5% amounts to economic costs
of USD 1,230,983 by 10% to USD 1,248,517; by 15% to
USD 1,266,051 and by 20% to USD 1,283,550. Decreas-
ing the SERSAP budget by 5% amounts to economic
costs of USD 1,195,911; by 10% to USD 1,178,377; by
15% to USD 1,160,840; and by 20% to USD 1,143,306
(Additional file 9).
Discussion
This study is first of its kind to accurately trace both the
financial and economic costs of CBT. By assessing the
overall economic value of a CBT intervention, our study
makes a unique contribution to the very limited litera-
ture available on the cost of targeting in general, both
Fig. 1 Distribution of economic costs by actor
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within and beyond the health sector. The lack of com-
parable empirical literature seems to be due to the fact
that the budget statements of targeting interventions in
LMICs do not generally indicate costs by process or ac-
tivity [11]. Lack of comparable studies limits our ability
to discuss our results extensively in light of prior evi-
dence, especially when considering the economic value
of the intervention. Nevertheless, when relevant, we do
appraise our findings in relation to the two published
studies that assessed the financial costs of CBT [18, 19]
and to the one unpublished report [11] which also
accounted for the value of the time contributed by un-
compensated community members.
A unique trait of our study is its reliance on ABC, a
conceptual approach identified as the preferred one to
cost complex health interventions, also in LMICs [35].
The application of ABC allowed us to estimate both the
financial and economic costs of the CBT intervention
per activity in a highly systematic and accurate manner.
This high level of accuracy was ensured by the fact that
instead of relying on financial statements as our primary
source of information, we started our work by tracing all
activities that made up the intervention and all resources
consumed by these activities, looking for corresponding
financial values only afterwards. Furthermore, combining
ABC with Resource Consumption Accounting [36]
allowed us to trace the single cost categories within each
activity, generating a very detailed map for policy makers
of what activities and what items within activities drove
the intervention costs. It needs to be noted, however,
that the application of this methodological approach is
usually not inexpensive [31]. In our specific case, we
could rely on ABC costing only because our access to all
implementation documents was facilitated by our team’s
close relation with the implementation teams and its de-
velopment partners.
We estimated a financial cost of USD 587,510 and an
economic cost of USD 1,213,447 for the entire CBT
intervention, including its design and implementation
phase. With a total of 102,609 identified ultra-poor, this
corresponds to a financial cost of USD 5.73 and an eco-
nomic cost of USD 11.83 per ultra-poor person
identified. As demonstrated in Additional files 2, 3 and
4, our results were neither highly sensitive to variation
of the applied wage nor to changes in the percentage of
overhead costs or the budget provided by SERSAP. The
consistency of our results from primary analysis with
those of the sensitivity analysis suggests a good robust-
ness of our findings.
Our study estimated financial costs per ultra-poor per-
son identified to be within the same range of what was
estimated in the few prior comparable studies. In par-
ticular, Ridde et al. [18], traced the financial expenses of
a CBT action research project in one district of Burkina
Faso and calculated financial cost of USD 10.16 per
identified person. The financial costs Aryeetey et al. [19]
calculated for a Participatory Wealth Ranking exercise in
Ghana were calculated to be USD 3.83 per identified
person in an urban setting, USD 10.63 for a rural setting
and 2.71 for a semi-urban setting (calculation: survey
costs without exemption premium divided by the total
number of people exempted). Compared to the study of
Watkins [11], who calculated financial cost of approxi-
mately USD 25 per recipient, our estimate is much
lower. Differences are likely to be attributable to differ-
ent implementation strategies as well to differences in
methodological pathways to cost estimation.
Additionally, the study draws attention to the large dis-
crepancy between financial and economic cost.Similarly to
Watkins [11], we found the difference to be driven by the
valuation of human resources, specifically the fact that we
valued the time contributed towards the initiative by com-
munity volunteers. The heavy reliance on communities as
key players in the implementation of the targeting interven-
tion is well aligned with the push towards decentralization
and community involvement, which has prevailed across
sub-Saharan Africa following the Bamako Initiative [37].
Still this high reliance on communities as actual imple-
menting agents raises important questions in terms of ac-
ceptability and feasibility. On the one hand, targeting of
health services based on community-based approaches is
likely to result in a more accurate and more acceptable
identification strategy than one based on experts’ (i.e.
healthcare providers) judgment [9, 16, 28, 38] and is likely
Table 3 Financial and economic costs – design phase by cost categories across activity clusters (in USD)
Activity Cluster Financial Costs Percentage (%) Economic Costs Percentage (%)
1. General Coordination & Management Design
Human Resources 6348 85% 44,754 71%
Room Rental 0 0% 332 0.5%
Transportation 0 0% 16,837 26,7%
Consumables 251 3% 251 0.4%
Overhead 858 12% 858 1.4%
Grand Total 7457 100% 63,032 100%
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to be more attractive in the eyes of implementing agencies
given its relatively low financial costs [11]. On the other
hand, our study indicates that the time committed by vol-
unteers has a clear opportunity cost, measured in terms of
their foregone economic value. This observation questions
the adequacy of executing CBT by adding an additional
burden to communities already operating in resource-con-
strained settings and often struggling to meet their most
basic needs [16, 38]. The challenge is that of relying on the
expertise of communities, while at the same time offering
Table 4 Financial and economic costs – implementation phase by costs categories across activity clusters (in USD)
Activity Cluster Financial Costs (in USD) Economic Costs (in USD)
(II) Implementation Phase 1. General Coordination & Management
Implementation Phase
Human Resources 18,751 45,408
Room Rental 126 358
Transportation 2472 15,409
Consumables 2002 2002
Total 23,351 63,177
2. Training
Human Resources 44,408 117,895
Room Rental 5862 5862
Transportation 11,218 11,218
Consumables 24,809 24,849
Total 86,297 159,824
3. Selection of the ultra-poor
Human Resources 71,386 378,284
Room Rental 0 0
Transportation 12,947. 12,947
Consumables 829 829
Total 85,162 392,060
4. Data Collection
Human Resources 133,591 274,601
Room Rental 0 0
Transportation 6463 6463
Consumables 47,894 47.894
Total 187,948 328,958
5. Card Production/Distribution
Human Resources 0 7565
Room Rental 0 0
Transportation 0 1536
Consumables 107,000 107,000
Total 107,000 116,101
6. M&E
Human Resources 8140 8140
Room Rental 0 0
Transportation 3199 3199
Consumables 0 0
Total 11,339 11,339
Overhead 78,956 78,956
Grand Total Implementation Phase 580,053 1,150,415
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adequate compensation for their engagement [39]. This is
meant to sustain their motivation in contributing to such
activities and avoid withdrawal during the implementation
phase, as observed in some communities during the inter-
vention described in our study [29].
Looking at the distribution of costs across activities
provides additional evidence that financial and economic
valuations do not necessarily align, as we see that the ac-
tual identification of the ultra-poor (the core activity del-
egated to communities) accounted for less than one
sixth of all financial costs, but for one third of all eco-
nomic costs. Moreover, the high cost associated with
preparing for and producing identification cards may be
surprising for those unfamiliar with the intervention,
since the two activities combined accounted for nearly
50% of all financial costs. While we have been reassured
by key stakeholders (personal communication) that the
cost of card production was much lower in Vietnam
compared to what it would have been in Burkina Faso,
our appraisal of this specific set of findings inevitably
questions the need for sophisticated individual digita-
lized cards vs. simpler household traditional paper-based
cards. It is beyond the scope of our work to assess the
comparative advantage of a system based on digitalized
vs. traditional paper-based identification cards, albeit we
do imagine this to be a relevant area for further research,
estimating cost-effectiveness of one system compared to
the other. Likewise, the government and its partners, in
Burkina as elsewhere, could test the possibility of lower-
ing CBT costs by integrating activities related to the
database establishment into the initial identification
effort.
Furthermore, when assessing both the financial and
the economic value of targeting interventions, one must
consider the extent to which these are driven by national
governments or by development partners [40]. In the
specific case analyzed in our study, the largest portion of
the financial costs (60%), excluding the card production
that was paid directly by the WB, were accrued by a
local for-profit organization, SERSAP, which in turn was
contracted by the governmental agency PADS. In prac-
tice, however, the resources deployed for the identifica-
tion and selection procedure originated in a grant made
by the HRITF to the government of Burkina Faso, chan-
neled via the PADS. This explicit donor involvement
sheds yet a different light on the appraisal of the finan-
cial costs associated with targeting programs. Spending
close to USD 6 per ultra-poor person identified may be
affordable for international agencies specifically commit-
ted to fostering greater equity in access, but is likely to
be unaffordable for most LMICs, considering overall low
levels of public spending on health [41]. Specifically,
without aiming at conducting a full budget impact ana-
lysis – a task beyond our initial study objectives – it is
worthwhile to appraise financial costs in relation to the
overall health budget of Burkina Faso. The USD 5.73 per
ultra-poor person identified are equivalent to 21% of
Burkina Faso’s per capita government expenditure on
health (USD 27 (in PPP International USD, year: 2015))
[42]. At the same time, however, one must consider that
targeting approaches are implemented beyond the health
sector alone and hence there may be potential in sharing
costs for pro-poor identification and selection proce-
dures across sectors [43, 44].
Methodological considerations
We also faced some challenges during data collection
and analysis, which are worthwhile discussing here as
potential limitations of our study. First, we assessed the
value of resources consumed by SERSAP activities on
the basis of the unit costs and the units consumed as in-
dicated in the initial implementation budgets rather than
in the closing financial statements, to which we could
not gain access. Hence, we cannot fully exclude having
Fig. 2 Distribution of financial costs – Implementation Phase
Fig. 3 Distribution of economic costs – Implementation Phase
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over or underestimated unit costs or resource consump-
tion for some items. Nevertheless, given that we triangu-
lated information coming from SERSAP documentation
with information obtained during the key informant in-
terviews, we are quite confident that we have not largely
misestimated these values. Second, our analysis did not
account for any fixed costs incurred at SERSAP as the
agency was already operative and the targeting process
only built upon it. This might have led to an underesti-
mation of the full cost of CBT. Third, we must also
mention that tracing all activities and all related resource
consumption was difficult due to the retrospective na-
ture of our study. It would have been desirable to con-
duct a prospective study which could have generated
more accurate data [35] by applying the ABC-method
from the onset. The retrospective nature of the study
also opened the way to recall bias, since we interviewed
key players about one year after cards were distributed.
Conclusion
Universal Health Coverage can only be achieved by en-
suring that the poorest are not left behind. Thus, it is
necessary that once implemented, measures to identify
and address health inequity are systematically evaluated.
With our study, we set the first example of how to sys-
tematically assess both the financial and economic costs
of a community-based targeting program in a LMIC set-
ting. We view the contribution of this costing study as
meaningful, particularly because pro-poor targeting pro-
grams continue to expand, within and beyond the health
sector. Future research should not only replicate this ap-
proach in other settings to generate additional and com-
parable evidence to better inform policy, but should also
reach beyond the mere estimation of the costs to assess
the costs of targeting in relation to the benefits accrued,
within the framework of a comprehensive economic
evaluation, such as a cost-effectiveness analysis.
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